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Abstract
Traders’ values and information typically consist of both private and common-value
elements. In such environments, full allocative efficiency is impossible when the private
rate of information substitution differs from the social rate (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001).
We link this impossibility result to a failure of the efficient market hypothesis, which states
that prices adequately reflect all available information (Fama, 1970, 1991). The intuition
is that if prices were able to reveal all information then the common value would simply
shift traders’ private values by a known constant and full allocative efficiency would result.
In a series of laboratory experiments we study price formation in markets with private
and common values. Rational expectations, which form the basis for the efficient market
hypothesis, predict that the introduction of common values has no adverse consequences
for allocative and informational efficiency. In contrast, a “private” expectations model
in which traders’ optimal behavior depends on both their private and common-value
information predicts that neither full allocative nor full informational efficiency is possible.
We test these competing hypotheses and find that the introduction of common values
lowers allocative efficiency by 28% on average, as predicted by the private expectations
model, and that market prices differ significantly and substantially from their rational
expectation levels. Finally, a comparison of observed and predicted payoffs suggests that
observed behavior is close to the equilibrium predicted by the private expectations model.
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1. Introduction
The ability of market institutions to aggregate dispersed information and produce correct prices
is of central importance to their well functioning. In private-value commodity markets, prices
determine traders’ opportunity sets and correct prices ensure that the market clears and total
gains from trade are maximized. In common-value asset markets, prices play the additional role
of informing traders about underlying asset values and correct prices make profitable arbitrage
impossible. These desired features have been observed in many laboratory studies that employ
the continuous double auction (CDA), the most commonly used trading institution for con-
temporary financial and commodity markets. Hundreds of experiments have confirmed Vernon
Smith’s (1962) finding that, in private value commodity markets, the CDA converges quickly
and reliably to competitive equilibrium outcomes.1 Furthermore, in common value asset mar-
ket experiments, trade prices in the CDA have been shown to accurately summarize traders’
dispersed private information thus providing laboratory evidence for the efficient market hy-
pothesis (Fama, 1970, 1991).2,3 As Cason and Friedman (1996) note “it is folk wisdom, at least
among experimenters, that the CDA has remarkable powers to promote price formation.”
Real-world markets, however, rarely fit the idealized extreme cases of pure private or pure
common values. Private-value commodities may have deficiencies or can be resold, which adds
a common-value element. Likewise, in common-value asset markets, private-value differences
naturally arise when investors face varying capital gains tax-rates, hold different long/short
positions (e.g. Nyborg and Strebulaev, 2004), or different portfolios.
1Vernon Smith coined this finding a “scientific mystery” because convergence to competitive equilibrium
occurs even when it is not predicted. Static competitive equilibrium theory relies on the assumptions that
each trader is a price taker, there is free entry and exit, and there are an infinite number of potential entrants.
In experiments, the CDA robustly converges to competitive equilibrium even with few buyers and sellers who
act as price makers rather than price takers and who have only private information about values and costs.
Furthermore, participants do not need experience or a deep understanding of economics and convergence is
robust to changes in subject pools (e.g. students, businessmen, government officials, etc., see Smith, 2010).
The competitive equilibrium is reached even when demand (supply) is completely elastic so that the demand
(supply) side of the market gets almost no surplus (Smith and Walker, 1993). See Friedman and Rust (1993),
Plott and Smith (2005), and Smith (2010) for excellent surveys.
2Early experimental evidence was provided by Plott and Sunder (1982), Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott (1982),
and Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984). For a recent study see, e.g., Huber, Angerer, and Kirchler (2011).
3The degree to which information gets successfully aggregated depends on certain market features, including
the number of informed traders (Camerer and Weigel, 1991), whether the state of nature is revealed ex post
(O’Brien, 1990), the complexity of the assets being traded (e.g. single-state versus multi-state assets, Plott and
Sunder, 1988; single-period versus multi-period assets, O’Brien and Srivastava, 1991), whether the information
technology and distributional assumptions are common knowledge (Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990), and trader
experience (Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990). See Sunder (1995) for a thoughtful survey. Our study differs from
this prior work in that we consider a setting where allocative and informational inefficiencies may arise even
with rational traders.
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When both private and common values are present, markets cannot generally achieve full
allocative efficiency. This impossibility result was first shown by Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000) for one-sided markets (auctions),4 and generalized to arbitrary mechanisms
including two-sided markets by Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). The reason is that the way in
which a trader’s information affects her own value from a transaction may differ from the way
it impacts the social value. Intuitively, a trader with a high private value should become a
net buyer but she may instead sell if her common value information is negative, with adverse
consequences for allocative efficiency. In this paper, we link the impossibility of full allocative
efficiency to a failure of the efficient market hypothesis. The intuition for this link is simple. If
full informational efficiency were possible then the common value would simply shift traders’
private values by a known constant, which would leave traders’ incentives and the total gains
from trade unaltered and full allocative efficiency should result.
In a series of laboratory experiments we test price formation in markets with private and
common values. Experiments are ideally suited to study market performance in this setting
because the various informational conditions, endowments, and preferences can be induced to
fit the theoretical models. This allows for a clean measurement of allocative and informational
inefficiencies, which would be hard to identify based on econometric analyses of field data. Be-
sides the introduction of private and common-value elements, our experimental design departs
from that of previous literature in two important ways. First, market participants do not have
preassigned roles of buyers or sellers. Instead, each market participant is a trader who can
choose to either buy or sell (or not trade at all) based on their own private information, as
is the case in most financial markets. Second, traders receive new private and common value
information at the start of each period so that each period represents a new price formation
process.5 The motivation for these two design choices is that it allows for clean theoretical
predictions and that fully efficient trade is possible in our setup, i.e. there exists an incentive
compatible, individually rational mechanism that delivers all gains from trade (Cramton, Gib-
bons, and Klemperer, 1987). This would not be possible, for instance, with fixed buyer and
seller roles (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983).
Rational expectations (e.g. Muth, 1961), which underlie the efficient market hypothesis,
predict that the introduction of common values has no adverse consequences for allocative and
informational efficiency. In contrast, a “private” expectations model in which traders’ optimal
4See also Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000) and Goeree and Offerman (2002, 2003).
5Cason and Friedman (1996) and Kagel (2004) also used random values and costs for each trading period in
double auction markets where participants had fixed trading roles, either as buyers or as sellers. Importantly, in
such a setting with asymmetric property rights, Myerson and Satterthwaite’s (1983) impossibility result implies
that no incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism can be fully efficient.
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behavior depends on both their private and common-value information predicts that neither
allocative nor informational efficiency is possible. To test these competing hypotheses, we
compare market performance in a treatment with only private values to a treatment with both
private and common values. We find that the introduction of common values causes allocative
efficiency to drop by 28% on average, as correctly predicted by the private expectations model.
In addition, prices are systematically biased away from their rational expectations levels and
the observed deviations are increasing in the size of the common value. Also these findings are
in line with the predictions of the private expectations model.
We explore how the degree of competition affects market performance.6 In our experiment,
the number of traders varies from two to three to eight. We find that an increase in competi-
tion significantly raises allocative efficiency, both with and without common values. However,
with common values, allocative efficiency losses remain large (> 40%) even with eight traders.
There is little effect of competition on informational efficiency with private values only and
price deviations are moderately small. In contrast, with common values, price deviations from
rational expectations predictions are substantial and increase with the number of traders.
A final contribution of the paper is to test for equilibrium behavior. As noted by Smith
(2010) “the challenge of the CDA empirical results has not yielded game theoretic models
that predict convergence to a static competitive equilibrium.”7 We agree that a direct test of
equilibrium behavior in this dynamic game of incomplete information where players can move
at unspecified times is out of reach. However, for the simple environment employed in the
experiment, incentive compatibility makes precise predictions about how traders’ equilibrium
payoffs should vary with their private information. By comparing predicted and observed
payoffs we test for equilibrium and find that observed behavior is in line with predictions of
the private expectations model.
1.1. Organization
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the experimental design
and procedures. Section 3 presents the two theoretical models to be tested. Section 4 reports
results on allocative and informational efficiency levels, the determinants of trade, and tests
for equilibrium behavior. Section 5 concludes. Instructions, which include screen shots of the
zTree program (Fischbacher, 2007) used by the subjects, can be found in the Appendix.
6In Vernon Smith’s (1962) original double auction market experiments with private value commodities, the
competitive equilibrium is attained even with a small number of traders. In a common value asset market
experiment, Lundholm (1991) finds that an increase in the number of traders does not necessarily lead to better
information aggregation.
7Friedman (2010) provides a more positive account of game theoretic modeling of behavior in the CDA.
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2. Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiments were based on a straightforward 2 × 3 between-subject design, see Table 1.
The treatments included private values (PV) versus private plus common values (PVCV) and
variations in group size (n = 2, n = 3, and n = 8). In each of the treatments, the induced
private values ranged from 201 to 300 points with each integer number being equally likely. We
used the same private values in the PV and associated PVCV treatments (e.g. the same private
values in PV2 as in PVCV2) to ensure that any observed differences in the gains from trade
were not due to differences in the random draws. In the PVCV treatments, subjects received
an additional common value signal that was either −25 or +25, both outcomes being equally
likely. The common value was simply equal to the sum of all the common-value signals in a
group. A subject’s total value for the good was equal to the private value plus the common
value.8 At the start of each period, subjects received new private values and, if applicable,
new common-value signals. Private values and common-vale signals were independent across
subjects and periods.
Subjects traded in a continuous double auction. At the start of each period, subjects were
endowed with one unit of the good and 500 cash. Subjects valued at most two units of the good.
Negative holdings of the good or cash were not allowed (i.e. no “short selling”). Only a single
unit of the good could be traded by each subject in each period. This design choice follows
Cason and Friedman (1996) who note that it allows for sharp theoretical predictions without
dubious auxiliary assumptions. In particular, it allows us to predict how traders’ equilibrium
payoffs vary with their information.
Subjects could submit limit orders (bids and asks) as well as market orders. All orders were
executed instantaneously and prioritized according to price in an open bid book. Standing
orders and transactions were updated on the traders’ screens in real time and the price of the
latest transaction was indicated by the “market price.” At the end of the period, subjects were
shown a results screen, which indicated their information (private value and, if applicable, the
common value signal and the common value), their transactions (bought or sold a unit or no
trade), and their net earnings. Subjects’ earnings were calculated as the difference between
their final wealth (value of the items they owned plus final cash position) and their initial
wealth (value of one item plus 500 cash). In other words, subjects had to trade to make money.
Subjects were recruited at the University of Zu¨rich and the neighboring ETH. A total of
168 subjects participated in eight sessions with 18-24 people in each session. Each session
8The lower bound of 201 for the private values was chosen such that the total value of the good would be
positive even if all traders had negative common value signals in PVCV8 treatment.
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Treatment Group Size
Number of 
Groups
Number of 
Periods
Private 
Values
Common Value 
Signals
Average 
Earnings
PV2 2 9 10 U[201, 300] CHF 38.30
PV3 3 6 10 U[201, 300] CHF 36.83
PV8 8 6 10 U[201, 300] CHF 46.89
PVCV2 2 9 10 U[201, 300] U{-25, 25} CHF 24.60
PVCV3 3 6 10 U[201, 300] U{-25, 25} CHF 30.32
PVCV8 8 6 10 U[201, 300] U{-25, 25} CHF 34.99
Table 1: The experiments used a 2 × 3 between-subject design that varied the information/value
structure, PV (private values) and PVCV (private and common values), and the group size n = 2,
n = 3, and n = 8. The private values are uniformly distributed between 201 and 300 and the common
value signals are equally likely to be +25 or −25. In the PV treatments, a trader’s value is equal to
her private value and in the PVCV treatments a trader’s value is equal to her private value plus the
sum of all common value signals in the group.
consisted of two unpaid practice periods followed by ten paid periods of 120 seconds each. The
sessions lasted somewhere between 75 and 90 minutes, including instructions and payment.
The exchange rate used in the experiment was 0.2, i.e. five experimental points equaled one
Swiss Franc. Average earnings ranged from approximately 25 to 47 Swiss Francs depending on
the treatment, see the final column in Table 1.
3. Theoretical Considerations
In Section 3.1 we establish that full allocative efficiency is possible with only private values.
In other words, for all possible private value draws, it can be individually rational and incen-
tive compatible for low-value traders to sell to the high-value traders.9 Section 3.2 considers
the case of private plus common-values. The rational expectations (RE) model predicts full
informational efficiency and full allocative efficiency. In contrast, a private expectations model
(PE), in which traders act based on their private and common-value information, predicts that
only constrained-efficient trade is possible. In Section 3.3 we discuss the implications of these
theoretical predictions for the different treatments.
9This possibility result is akin to the efficient dissolution of a partnership when initial property rights are
non-extreme, see Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987). It contrasts with the impossibility of efficient trade
when property rights are extreme, i.e. when buyer and seller roles are fixed, as first shown by Myerson and
Sattherwaite (1983).
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3.1. Private Values
Recall that in our setup there are no fixed buyers and sellers: each market participant is
endowed with one unit of the good and values at most two units. So each market participant
can be a “trader” who, depending on the private value, can decide to become a net buyer or a
net seller. We normalize traders’ private values to lie between 0 and 1 by subtracting 200 from
their private value draw and dividing the result by 100. Let 0 ≤ v ≤ 1 denote the resulting
uniform random variable with distribution F (v) = v. Assuming efficient trade, the expected
amount bought by a trader with private value v is given by
P (v) =
n∑
k=1
sign(2k − n− 1)
(n− 1
k − 1
)
F (v)k−1(1− F (v))n−k (1)
where P (v) ≤ 0 for v ≤ 1
2
corresponds to minus the probability that a trader with value v sells
and P (v) ≥ 0 for v ≥ 1
2
corresponds to the probability that a trader with value v buys. Below
we refer to P (v) as the trade function. The binomial terms in the sum on the right side of (1)
represent the chance that for a trader with value v there are n − k other traders with higher
values and k − 1 with lower values for k = 1, . . . , n. Each term is weighted with a +1 or a
−1 depending on whether the trader’s value belongs to the top or bottom half of the values
respectively,10 which determines whether the trader should buy or sell.
A simple envelope theorem argument implies that a trader’s equilibrium expected payoff
satisfies pi′(v) = P (v), which can be integrated to yield
pi(v) = pi(1
2
) +
∫ v
1
2
P (w)dw,
where pi(1
2
) is the expected payoff of the trader with the “worst” possible value v = 1
2
. Intu-
itively, a very low value is beneficial because the trader is likely to sell at a price substantially
above her value. Likewise, a very high value is profitable when the trader can buy at a price
much lower than her value. With a value of 1
2
the trader is equally likely to be buy or sell at a
price close to her value, resulting in a low payoff.
Efficiency, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality can co-exist if even a trader
with the worst value has a non-negative expected payoff. The lowest payoff follows from the con-
dition that the sum of traders’ utilities is equal to the total surplus generated from reallocating
10And it is weighted with 0 if the trader has the median value in treatments with n = 3.
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units from low to high-value traders:
n∑
k=1
sign(2k − n− 1)E(vk | v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn) = n
∫ 1
0
pi(v)dF (v).
A direct computation yields that the lowest payoff is positive in all PV treatments.11 Let v[k]
for k = 1, . . . , n denote the sequence that results by rearranging the values in increasing order.
In other words, v[k] is the k-th order statistic with v[1] ≤ . . . ≤ v[n].
Proposition 1. Incentive compatible, individually rational, fully efficient trade is possible in
the private values treatments. The resulting gains from trade and market price are given by
W =
n∑
k=1
sign(2k − n− 1)v[k] (2)
p = Median(v1, · · · , vn) (3)
Here the median is equal to v[(n+1)/2] for n odd and it is equal to
1
2
(v[n/2] + v[n/2+1]) for n even.
3.2. Private plus Common Values
In the private plus common value treatments, trader i = 1, · · · , n receives an additional signal
θi ∈ {−25, 25} about the common value, which is simply equal to the sum of all signals:
Θ =
∑n
j=1 θj. Trader i’s total value is thus given by
ti = vi +
n∑
j=1
θj
Note that the common value term simply shifts all traders’ private values by an equal amount,
Θ. Hence, if the double auction is informationally efficient and market prices reveal the common
value then the efficient trade result of Proposition 1 applies (since adding a known constant to
traders’ values does not change the total gains from trade nor traders’ incentives).
Proposition 2. Under the rational expectations hypothesis, incentive compatible, individually
rational, efficient trade is possible in the private plus common values treatments. The resulting
gains from trade and the market price are given by
WRE =
n∑
k=1
sign(2k − n− 1)v[k] (4)
pRE = Median(v1, · · · , vn) + Θ (5)
11pi( 1
2
) is equal to 1
12
, 1
12
, and 187
2304
in the PV2, PV3, and PV8 treatments respectively.
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To see why full informational efficiency may not occur, note that trader i’s expected total value
depends only on the summary statistic ξi ≡ vi + θi since others’ private values and common
value signals are independently distributed. Hence, if ξi = ξj then trader i and j have the
same expected total value, even if their private values differ. As a result, bids and asks convey
information about traders’ summary statistics but not about their private and common value
signals separately, which precludes full information aggregation. Furthermore, it is easy to see
how trading based on summary statistics adversely affects allocative efficiency. Consider, for
instance, the case when one trader has a private value of 270 but a negative common value
signal while another trader has a private value of 230 with a positive common value signal.
Trading based on summary statistics results in a negative surplus of −40 while trading based
on private values yields a positive surplus of +40.
More generally, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) prove that no mechanism can achieve full
allocative efficiency in a setup with private and common values. The reason is that the way
a trader’s information impacts her value from a transaction differs from the way it impacts
the social value of that transaction.12 Intuitively, a positive common value signal benefits a
buyer but raises the opportunity cost for the selling counter party, i.e. while there is a private
benefit to having a positive common value signal the social value is zero. Stated differently, full
allocative efficiency requires that trading is based on private values only but traders’ incentive
constraints dictate their orders depend on both their private and common value information
via their summary statistics.
We next verify whether it can be incentive compatible and individually rational to have
constrained efficient trade, which occurs when traders with low summary statistics sell to those
with higher summary statistics. After normalization, the distribution of ξ is given by
G(ξ) = 1
2
F (ξ − 1
4
) + 1
2
F (ξ + 1
4
)
with support [−1
4
, 5
4
]. Incentive compatibility again implies that
pi(ξ) = pi(1
2
) +
∫ ξ
1
2
P (η)dη,
where P (·) is defined as in (1) with F (·) replaced by G(·). Individual rationality is ensured if
12Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show that full allocative efficiency requires a certain “congruence” condition
to hold. This condition dictates that the private and social rates of information substitution be the same, which
is possible only for non-generic cases and is not met, for instance, in the setup employed in the experiment.
8
and only if pi(1
2
) ≥ 0, where pi(1
2
) follows from the condition
n∑
k=1
sign(2k − n− 1)E(vk | ξ1 ≤ · · · ≤ ξn) = n
∫ 5
4
−
1
4
pi(ξ)dG(ξ).
A direct computation yields that the lowest payoff is positive in all PVCV treatments.13 Let vξ[k]
denote the sequence that follows by ordering traders’ private values according to their summary
statistics, e.g. vξ[1] is the private value of the trader with the lowest summary statistic and vξ[n]
is the private value of the trader with the highest summary statistic.
Proposition 3. Under the private expectations hypothesis, incentive compatible, individually
rational, constrained-efficient trade is possible in the private plus common values treatment.
The resulting gains from trade and the market price are given by
WPE =
n∑
k=1
sign(2k − n− 1)vξ[k] (6)
pPE = Median(ξ1, · · · , ξn) (7)
We end this section by noting some features that are the same with two or three traders (or,
more generally, with 2n and 2n+1 traders), both with private values only and with private and
common values. The reason is that in our setup with endogenous trading positions there will be
one trader left out of the market when the number of traders is odd. For example, with three
traders, the trader with the highest value buys from the trader with the lowest value and the
trader with the middle value is left out. The outcome is the same with two traders since then
the high-value trader simply buys from the low-value trader. In other words, the trade function
in (1) should be the same with two and three traders.14 Moreover, the per-capita surplus is the
same with two and three traders,15 and, hence, so are traders’ equilibrium payoffs.16
Proposition 4. The trade function P (v) (P (ξ)) and the equilibrium payoffs pi(v) (pi(ξ)) are the
same in the private value (private plus common value) treatments with two and three traders.
We next discuss the implications of these propositions for the experimental results.
13pi( 1
2
) is equal to 1
16
, 1
16
, and 8237
131072
in the PVCV2, PVCV3, and PVCV8 treatments respectively.
14With two traders P (v) = −(1−F (v)) +F (v) = 2F (v)− 1 while with three traders P (v) = −(1−F (v))2 +
F (v)2 = 2F (v)− 1. More generally, it is readily verified that (1) is the same with 2n and 2n+ 1 traders.
15With n = 2 traders, the expected lowest and highest values are 1
3
and 2
3
, so the per-capita surplus is 1
6
.
With n = 3 traders, the expected lowest and highest values are 1
4
and 3
4
, so the per-capita surplus is also 1
6
.
More generally, with uniformly distributed values, the per-capita surplus is the same with 2n and 2n+1 traders.
16See also Footnotes 11 and 13, which establish that pi( 1
2
) is the same with two and three traders.
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3.3. Hypotheses
Proposition 1 shows that with private values only there exists a fully efficient, individually
rational, and incentive compatible mechanism. Of course, it does not imply that any particular
mechanism, e.g. the continuous double auction, will be fully efficient. However, given its stellar
performance in previous private-value experiments, it is natural to conjecture that it is.
Hypothesis PV:
(AE) The continuous double auction results in full allocative efficiency in the PV
treatments independent of group size.
(IE) The continuous double auction results in full informational efficiency in the
PV treatments independent of group size.
When common values are introduced, market performance is unaffected under the rational
expectations (RE) model.
Hypothesis PVCV-RE:
(AE) The continuous double auction results in full allocative efficiency in the PVCV
treatments independent of group size.
(IE) The continuous double auction results in full informational efficiency in the
PVCV treatments independent of group size.
Under the private expectations model, there will be allocative inefficiencies since buy and sell
orders are based on traders’ summary statistics not their private values. The predicted fraction
of the surplus that is lost is given by
allocative efficiency loss =
WRE −WPE
WRE
where WRE and WPE are defined in (4) and (6) respectively. The private expectations model
also predicts that observed trade prices will differ from the correct ones, i.e. those predicted by
the rational expectations model. Since prices can be too high or too low, we take the absolute
value of the difference in predicted prices:
informational efficiency loss = |pRE − pPE|
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where pRE and pPE are defined in (5) and (7) respectively.
It is straightforward to compute the predicted allocative and informational losses for the
private and common values used in the experiments.17
Hypothesis PVCV-PE:
(AE) The introduction of common values causes an allocative efficiency loss of 35.6%,
22.0%, and 28.3% in the PVCV2, PVCV3, and PVCV8 treatments respectively.
(IE) The introduction of common values causes an informational efficiency loss of
12.8, 27.8, and 55.6 in the PVCV2, PVCV3, and PVCV8 treatments respec-
tively.
Finally, Proposition 4 implies some similarities between the outcomes of the PV and PVCV
treatments with two and three traders.
Hypothesis 2-3:
(PV) The observed trade and payoff functions are the same in the PV2 and PV3
treatments.
(PVCV) The observed trade and payoff functions are the same in the PVCV2 and
PVCV3 treatments.
The hypothesis is stated in terms of functions, so applies to all private values (summary statis-
tics) in the PV (PVCV) treatments. It does not imply that behavior in the two treatments
is necessarily identical, but rather that the average amount bought by a trader with value v
(summary statistic ξ) is the same and so is her payoff. The manner in which this comes about
might be quite different in the two treatments. Intuitively, the treatments with three traders
are more competitive since one trader will be left out, which likely affects behavior.
17The ex ante expected allocative loss is given by
1−
∑n
k=1 sign(2k − n− 1)E(vk | ξ1 ≤ · · · ≤ ξn)∑n
k=1 sign(2k − n− 1)E(vk | v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn)
which equals 25.0%, 25.0%, and 26.7% for the PVCV2, PVCV3, and PVCV8 treatments respectively. When
testing Hypothesis (AE) we use the percentages listed in the main text to avoid rejecting the theory because of
the random draws used in the experiment. Importantly, the ex ante expected loss is more or less independent of
group size and does not vanish in the limit when n grows large: WRE limits to
1
2
n(E(v|v > 1
2
)−E(v|v < 1
2
)) = 1
4
n
while WPE limits to
1
2
n(E(v|ξ > 1
2
)− E(v|ξ < 1
2
)) = 3
16
n, so the expected allocative loss limits to 25%.
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4. Results
We first discuss results pertaining to the allocative efficiency losses observed in the experiment
(Section 4.1) and then discuss the informational efficiency losses (Section 4.2). In Section 4.3
we study the determinants of trade and Section 4.4 tests for equilibrium behavior.
4.1. Allocative Efficiency
The loss measures introduced in the previous section were constructed under the assumption
that either the rational expectations model or the private expectations model applies. Of
course, in the experiments neither one of them may be 100% correct. To measure deviations
from either model without assuming that if one fails the other applies, we introduce the following
loss measures:
allocative efficiency loss RE =
1
GT
G∑
g=1
T∑
t=1
W
g,t
RE −W
g,t
obs
W
g,t
RE
allocative efficiency loss PE =
1
GT
G∑
g=1
T∑
t=1
W
g,t
PE −W
g,t
obs
W
g,t
RE
with G the number of different groups per treatment (see Table 1), T = 10 the number of peri-
ods, and the t and g superscripts indicate that observed and predicted surpluses are determined
for each group and each period separately.
The results are shown in the top panel of Figure 1. The top-left panel pertains to the PV
treatments and the top-right panel to the PVCV treatments. Recall that in the PV treatments,
there is no difference between the private and rational expectations models – both models
predict full allocative efficiency. The non-negligible losses indicated by the bars in the top-left
panel of Figure 1 suggest that this prediction is not borne out by the data. We test this and
other hypotheses formally by running an OLS regression where the independent variable is
the percentage efficiency loss for a group in a given period and the regressors are group size
dummies (Two Traders, Three Traders, Eight Traders). The results are shown in the first two
columns of Table 2. The top panel of Table 2 labeled “PV” shows that Hypothesis PV(AE)
can be rejected: the allocative efficiency losses are 32.2%, 22.4%, and 12.8% for groups of size
two, three, and eight respectively.
Result 1: In the private values treatments, the continuous double auction results
in significant allocative efficiency losses that are decreasing with group size.18
18The test results of Table 2 are corroborated by non-parametric tests. For example, a Kruskal-Wallis test
rejects the hypothesis that allocative efficiency loss is independent of group size in the PV treatments (p = 0.07).
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Figure 1: Allocative efficiency losses (top panels) and informational efficiency losses (bottom panels)
in the different treatments. The two left panels pertain to the PV treatments and the two right panels
to the PVCV treatments. The bars show the allocative and informational losses with respect to the
private expectations model (light) or the rational expectations model (dark).
To understand why the CDA does not always yield efficient allocations in the PV treatments
suppose the private value draws are such that many traders have low values. Then mostly sell
orders will be submitted and a fully efficient outcome with some low-value traders buying may
not materialize, especially when the total gains from trade are small.
The top-right panel of Figure 1 shows allocative efficiency losses when common values are
introduced. The dark bars indicate that observed allocative efficiency losses are significant
and substantial: 63.3%, 45.4%, and 40.9% for groups of size two, three, and eight respectively.
Hypotheses PVCV-RE(AE) is also rejected.
Result 2: In the private plus common values treatments, the continuous double
auction results in significant allocative efficiency losses that are decreasing with
group size.19 However, losses remain substantial (> 40%) even with eight traders.
19A Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the hypothesis that allocative efficiency loss is independent of group size in
the PVCV treatments (p = 0.016).
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RE PE RE PE
PV
    Two Traders 32.22** 32.22** 9.68** 9.68**
(5.49) (5.49) (1.10) (1.10)
    Three Traders 22.39** 22.39** 18.18** 18.18**
(4.46) (4.46) (3.39) (3.39)
    Eight Traders 12.79** 12.79** 10.14** 10.14**
(1.34) (1.34) (0.68) (0.68)
PVCV - PV
    Two Traders 31.11** -4.44 21.94** 11.30**
(6.75) (6.31) (3.64) (2.95)
    Three Traders 23.01** 0.96 21.95** 3.08
(7.21) (8.48) (6.99) (4.84)
    Eight Traders 28.09** -0.23 55.43** 7.44*
(6.03) (4.40) (4.35) (3.22)
Observations 420 420 610 610
Log Likelihood -2237 -2295 -2872 -2571
Number of Clusters 42 42 42 42
Competition Effects (F test)
    PV 7.59** 7.59** 2.88 2.88
    PVCV 6.47** 4.25* 19.17** 0.43
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
OLS Regression: Efficiency Losses
Model: Rational Expectations (RE) or Private Expectations (PE)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by groups
Allocative Loss Informational Loss
Table 2: OLS regressions of allocative and informational efficiency losses on group size and com-
mon value dummies. The “PV” panel shows identical losses under the RE and PE models. The
“PVCV−PV” panel shows the additional losses when common values are introduced. The “Competi-
tion Effects” in the bottom panel test whether efficiency losses are independent of group size.
Interestingly, comparing the light bars in the top-left and top-right panels of Figure 1 shows
that the differences between observed allocative efficiencies and those predicted by the private
expectations model are very similar for the PV and PVCV treatments. The PE column in
the middle panel of Table 2 labeled “PVCV−PV” confirms this: none of the group size dum-
mies that measure the difference between the PVCV and PV treatments are significant. This
suggests that the PE model correctly describes how traders incorporate the additional com-
mon value information. To test this formally we compare the numbers in the RE column of
the “PVCV−PV” panel of Table 2 to those in Hypothesis PVCV-PE(AE). The result is that
Hypothesis PVCV-PE(AE) cannot be rejected.20
20An F -test whether the three predicted numbers (35.6%, 22.0%, 28.3%) are the same as the observed ones
(31.1%, 23.0%, 28.1%) yields an insignificant test statistic F (3, 41) = 0.15, where 41 is the residual degrees of
freedom given that we had 42 independent groups. These results can be corroborated by a non-parametric sign
test based on 21 observed and predicted differences (between PV and PVCV).
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Result 3: The increase in allocative efficiency losses when common values are
introduced are correctly predicted by the private expectations model.
To summarize, the CDA results in allocative efficiency losses even with private values only,
which is not predicted by either the private or the rational expectations model. Losses diminish
with competition and are roughly 13% in large groups of eight traders, which is in line with
results of previous studies.21 When common values are introduced, losses are significantly
higher and remain substantial (> 40%) even with large groups. The increase in allocative
efficiency losses are correctly predicted by the private expectations model. Averaging over all
treatments, the observed increase in allocative efficiency loss is 27.9%, which is very close and
not significantly different from the 28.5% increase predicted by the PE model.
4.2. Informational Efficiency
The informational efficiency loss measures for the RE and PE models are also defined at the
group/period level and then averaged over all groups and periods:
informational efficiency loss RE =
1
GTJ
G∑
g=1
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
|pg,t,jobs − p
g,t
RE|
informational efficiency loss PE =
1
GTJ
G∑
g=1
T∑
t=1
J∑
j=1
|pg,t,jobs − p
g,t
PE|
where J is the observed number of trades in a period.22
The results are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. As before, there is no difference
between the predictions of the RE and PE models with private values only – both predict
full informational efficiency. The bars in the left-bottom panel suggest otherwise. To test this
formally consider the OLS regression results in the final two columns of Table 2. The top panel
labeled “PV” shows that Hypothesis PV(IE) can be rejected: the informational efficiency losses
are 9.7, 18.2, and 10.1 for groups of size two, three, and eight respectively.
Result 4: In the private values treatments, the continuous double auction results
in significant informational efficiency losses for all group sizes.
21For instance, Cason and Friedman (1995) find in a setting with random values/costs and fixed buyer/seller
roles that efficiency in the CDA averages 86% – 94% when there are eight to ten traders.
22Since subjects were endowed with one unit and valued at most two units, J is at most one when n = 2, 3
and J is at most four when n = 8. Periods for which the observed number of trades is zero are discarded when
computing the informational efficiency losses.
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While the observed deviations are statistically significant they seem small, especially taking
into account that we used point predictions for the RE (or PE) model. In treatments with an
even number of traders there typically is a range of possible equilibrium prices and we simply
used the midpoint of that range.
The bottom-right panel of Figure 1 shows the informational efficiency losses when common
values are introduced. The dark bars show that informational losses are now quite large: 31.6,
40.1, and 65.6 for groups of size two, three, and eight respectively. Also Hypothesis PVCV-
RE(IE) is rejected.
Result 5: In the private plus common values treatments, the continuous double
auction results in significant informational efficiency losses for all group sizes. Losses
are especially large with eight traders.
The light bars in the bottom-right panel in Figure 1 are higher than those in the bottom-
left panel, indicating that the introduction of common values results in larger deviations from
the private expectations model (see also the significant dummies in the PE column of the
“PVCV−PV” panel in Table 2). This is somewhat intuitive in that the introduction of addi-
tional common value signals results in a more noisy environment with more volatile prices. We
next test Hypothesis PVCV-PE(IE).23
Result 6: The increase in informational efficiency losses when common values are
introduced are correctly predicted by the private expectations model.
Observed prices differ from rational expectations predictions especially in large groups, see
Result 5. To understand why this is the case, recall that the predicted price under the rational
expectations model is the median private value plus the sum of all common value signals. Under
the private expectations model the predicted price is equal to the median summary statistic,
which consists of a private value and a single common value signal. As a result, the difference
between the predictions of the rational and private expectations models grows (roughly) linearly
with the size of the common value.
The dashed line in Figure 2 shows this difference in predictions based on the draws used
in the experiment. The “V” shape confirms the above argument that the difference grows
23An F -test whether the three predicted numbers (12.8, 27.8, 55.6) are the same as the observed ones (21.9,
22.0, 55.4), see the RE column of the “PVCV−PV” panel in Table 2, yields an insignificant test statistic
F (3, 41) = 2.34 with a p-value of 0.09 (the difference is mainly driven by the n = 2 treatment). A non-
parametric sign test based on 21 observed and predicted differences (between PV and PVCV) also does not
yield a significant difference (p-value of 0.66).
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Figure 2: The dashed line shows the difference between rational expectations and private expectations
predictions. The thick red line shows observed deviations from rational expectations predictions and
the thin blue line shows observed deviations from private expectations predictions.
linearly with the magnitude of the common value. Figure 2 also shows the difference between
observed prices and predictions of the private expectations model (thin blue line) and the
rational expectations model (thick red line). The thin blue line is more or less flat at a height
of 12.5, indicating there are small deviations from the private expectations model (see also
Table 2) but these deviations are independent of the common value. In contrast, the thick
red line shows that deviations from the rational expectations model grow with the size of the
common value. These findings complement Result 6.
Result 7: Price deviations from rational expectations predictions are increasing in
the size of the common value as predicted by the private expectations model.
4.3. Determinants of Trade
The individual trade data allow us to estimate the relative weight that subjects place on their
common value signal vis-a`-vis their private signal. The private expectations model predicts this
weight to be 1 while full allocative efficiency requires this weight to be 0. Specifically, we run
the ordered Pobit regression
Yj =
∑
n=2,3,8
(vj −
1
2
)βPVn d
PV
n +
∑
n=2,3,8
(vj + αnθj −
1
2
)βPV CVn d
PV CV
n + εj
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(a) (b)
PV
    Two Traders 2.80**
(0.34)
    Three Traders 2.52**
(0.32)
    Two & Three Traders 2.66**
(0.23)
    Eight Traders 4.36** 4.36**
(0.26) (0.26)
PVCV
    Two Traders 1.43**
(0.31)
    Three Traders 1.91**
(0.31)
    Two & Three Traders 1.65**
(0.22)
    Eight Traders 2.55** 2.57**
(0.21) (0.21)
Relative Weight of CV Signal
    Two Traders 1.31**
(0.34)
    Three Traders 0.88*
(0.35)
    Eight Traders 0.87**
(0.22)
    Two & Three & Eight Traders 0.97**
(0.16)
Observations 1,680 1,680
Log Likelihood -1472 -1474
Cut points (-0.47, 0.47) (-0.47, 0.47)
Model (a) versus Model (b) 
     Likelihood-ratio test 3.18
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Ordered Probit Regression: Trade (Y = -1, 0, 1)
Table 3. Ordered Probit regression with trade (Y = −1 for sell, Y = 0 for no trade, and Y = 1 for
buy) as the dependent variable and treatment dummies as regressors. The test in the bottom panel
shows that trade is the same in treatments with two and three traders and that the weight on the
common value signal is the same for all group sizes. The weight is not significantly different from 1.
where Yj is −1, 0, or +1 when the trader sold, did not trade, or bought respectively, the d’s
are dummy variables that are 1 for the relevant treatment and 0 otherwise, and vj and θj are
the trader’s private information. Finally, the αn measure the relative weights placed on the
common value signal in each of the three PVCV treatments.
The results are shown in the column labeled “(a)” in Table 3. The column labeled “(b)”
shows a reduced model in which the dummies for the treatments with two and three traders
are forced to be the same and the weight placed on the common value signal is forced to be
the same for all group sizes. This model fits equally well, see the likelihood-ratio test in the
bottom panel.
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Result 8: The trade function is the same in treatments with group size two or
three but is more responsive to the private value/summary statistic in treatments
with a group size of eight.24
That the trade functions are the same with two or three traders does not imply that behavior
in these treatments is the same. Figure 3 shows the evolution of realized surplus in the different
treatments by blocks of 15 seconds (there are eight such blocks since the period lasted for two
minutes). Obviously, there is more of a “hold out” problem in the treatment with two traders
where most of the surplus is realized in the final 30 seconds. In contrast, in the private values
treatment with three traders almost all surplus is realized in the first 45 seconds. Note that for
all group sizes the introduction of common values shifts trades towards the second half of the
period as traders become more cautious.
Result 9: The hold out problem is more severe with two traders and is exacerbated
by the introduction of common values.
The extent to which there was a hold out problem in the different treatments can also be
measured by comparing the two possible sources of inefficiencies: missing trades or suboptimal
trades. The forgone surplus in the PV2 treatment is mainly due to missing trades (92.6%)
and rarely due to wrong trades (7.4%) that occur when a high-value trader sells to a low-value
trader. In contrast, there are no missing trades in the PV3 treatment where the entire loss in
surplus is due to suboptimal trades, e.g. the high-value trader buying from trader with the
medium value. When common values are introduced, the loss due to wrong trades more than
doubles to 18.8% in PVCV2 while in PVCV3 the loss from missing trades jumps to 23.3%.
25
Despite the different sources of inefficiencies, the average amount bought or sold by a trader of
a certain type is the same with two and three traders (Result 8).
Importantly, the estimation results in Table 3 show that the relative weight placed on the
common value signal is independent of group size and not significantly different from one,
providing additional support for the private expectations model.
Result 10: The relative weight placed on the common value signal is not signifi-
cantly different from 1.
24A χ2-test whether β2,3 = β8 is rejected at a p-value less than 0.0001 for the PV treatments and it is rejected
at a p-value of 0.002 for the PVCV treatments.
25In the PV8 treatment, 19.7% of the loss is because of missing trades and 80.3% due to suboptimal trades.
In the PVCV8 treatment, the loss due to missing trades is 30.8% and due to suboptimal trades is 69.2%.
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Figure 3: Evolution of surplus by blocks of 15 seconds in each of the treatments. The bars indicate
the fraction of the total surplus that was realized in each time block.
The estimation results in the final column of Table 3 can be used to construct the empirical
analogues of (1), i.e. the expected amount bought by a trader with value v in the PV treatments
or summary statistic ξ in the PVCV treatments. Importantly, the two cut-points produced by
the ordered Probit regressions are located symmetrically around zero: the first cut-point is at
−c = −0.47 and the second one is at c = 0.47, see Table 3. This implies that the empirical
analogues of (1) are anti-symmetric around v = 1
2
(ξ = 1
2
) for the PV (PVCV) treatments:26
Pobs(v) = Φ(β(v −
1
2
)− c) + Φ(β(v − 1
2
) + c)− 1
Pobs(ξ) = Φ(β(ξ −
1
2
)− c) + Φ(β(ξ − 1
2
) + c)− 1
The empirical trade functions are shown by the orange lines in Figure 4. The top panels
pertain to the PV treatments with n = 2, 3 pooled on the left and n = 8 on the right. The
bottom panels pertain to the PVCV treatments. Figure 4 also displays the observed average
amount bought (plus or minus one standard deviation) according to private values or summary
26In the PV treatments β = 2.66 when n = 2, 3 and β = 4.36 when n = 8, and in the PVCV treatments,
β = 1.65 when n = 2, 3 and β = 2.57 when n = 8, see Table 3. It is readily verified that Pobs(v) = −Pobs(1− v)
and Pobs(ξ) = −Pobs(1− ξ) for all v, ξ.
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Figure 4: The orange lines show the estimated trade function for a trader with value v in the PV
treatments (top panels) or a trader with summary statistic ξ in the PVCV treatments (bottom panels).
The estimated lines are based on the ordered Probit regressions reported in Table 3. The data points
with error bars indicate the average observed amount bought (plus or minus one standard deviation)
for private values (top) or summary statistics (bottom) that are categorized by bins of size 10.
statistics, which are grouped in bins of size 10. While there are some discrepancies between the
observed and estimated amounts bought (in particular for the PVCV treatments), the ordered
Probit regressions of Table 3 result in a good fit of the observed trade functions.
4.4. Testing for Equilibrium Behavior
There does not exist a complete description of equilibrium behavior for the dynamic continuous-
time double auction where players have private information and can move at unspecified times.
However, an indirect test follows from the observation that incentive compatibility, or equilib-
rium behavior, implies that pi′(v) = P (v). Using the empirical trade functions derived above
we can test for equilibrium behavior by comparing observed payoffs with those that follow from
this incentive compatibility condition. In particular, the predicted payoffs are given by
piobs(v) = piobs(
1
2
) +
∫ v
1
2
Pobs(w)dw,
where piobs(
1
2
) follows from the condition
Wobs = n
∫ 1
0
piobs(v)dF (v)
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Figure 5: The orange lines show the estimated payoffs of a trader with value v in the PV treatments
(top panels) or a trader with summary statistic ξ in the PVCV treatments (bottom panels). The
estimated lines are based on the empirical trade functions of Figure 3. The data points with error
bars indicate the average observed payoff (plus or minus one standard deviation) for private values
(top) or summary statistics (bottom) that are categorized by bins of size 10.
and Wobs is the observed surplus in the relevant PV treatment. Analogous expressions for the
PVCV treatments follow by replacing the private value v with the summary statistic ξ and F (v)
by G(ξ). We can combine the treatments with two and three traders if the observed per-capita
surplus is the same in these treatments. With only private values this is the case.27 With
private and common values, the difference in per-capita surplus is only marginally significant.28
We therefore decided to combine the n = 2 and n = 3 treatments, also to be able to present
the estimated payoff results in a manner parallel to Figure 4.
The orange lines in the top panels of Figure 5 show the results for the PV treatments with
n = 2, 3 pooled on the left and n = 8 on the right. The lines in the bottom panels show
analogous results for the PVCV treatments. The fit for the private value treatments is nearly
perfect. For the PVCV treatment, observed payoffs are more volatile and there are deviations
from theoretical predictions for extreme levels of the summary statistics. Overall the fit is good.
27For PV2 the per-capita surplus is 14.1 (1.0) and for PV3 it is 13.4 (0.7), where the number in parentheses
denotes the standard error based on 180 observations. A simple t-test cannot reject that the per-capita surplus
numbers are the same (p-value is 0.55).
28For PVCV2 the per-capita surplus is 7.3 (1.2) and for PVCV3 it is 10.1 (0.8), where the number in paren-
theses denotes the standard error based on 180 observations. A t-test marginally rejects that the per-capita
surplus numbers are the same at the 5% level (p-value is 0.046).
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Result 11: Observed payoffs are close to their predicted equilibrium levels.
Together, Results 8, 10, and 11 show that Hypothesis 2-3 cannot be rejected and suggest that
observed behavior is close to the equilibrium of the private expectations model.
5. Conclusions
Vernon Smith (2010) reviews the remarkable effectiveness of the continuous double auction to
produce competitive equilibrium outcomes in market experiments that employ private values.
He notes that despite this empirical success there exists no complete game theoretic explanation:
“we cannot model and predict what are subjects routinely accomplish” Smith (2010, p.5). The
results reported in this paper warrant a different conclusion. The private expectations model
correctly predicts the drop in allocative efficiency when common values are introduced (Result
3), correctly predicts the increase in informational inefficiency (Results 6 and 7), and correctly
predicts trade and payoff functions (Results 8, 10, and 11).
While these findings form three reasons to cheer for theory their empirical implications are
devastating. In the presence of private and common values, continuous double auction markets
result in substantial allocative losses (even with large groups) and prices differ markedly from
their rational expectations levels. Observed behavior reveals that traders weigh their private
and common value information equally as dictated by incentive compatibility. As a result,
allocative and informational inefficiencies are predicted to occur. The experimental results
confirm this “inefficient market hypothesis.”
One might argue that real markets are larger and information structures more complex. But
recall from Section 3 that the inefficiencies that occur with private and common values remain
when the number of traders grows large. And while the information technology employed
in the experiment was deliberately designed to be simple, all that is needed for inefficiencies
to arise more generally is that both private and common values matter. The experiments
convincingly demonstrate that subjects are able to combine both pieces of information in an
incentive compatible manner. Surely, real traders in real markets will be able to do so too. The
consequence is that real markets will be inefficient.
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